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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we reflect on the Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism to the UN Committee on World
Food Security as a policy convergence space for the global food sovereignty movement. Addressing a gap in the
convergence literature around inclusivity, we assess the extent to which the Mechanism is a diverse and inclusive
space. More specifically, we analyze whether constituencies and quotas have worked as effective tools to protect
diversity while avoiding fragmentation. We further contribute to the growing literature on convergence spaces
by highlighting what changes and challenges occur when convergence is situated and managed in relation to a
more formal institutional space. Analyzing how the it has addressed the two challenges of fragmentation and
institutionalization, we show how the Mechanism has moved towards greater inclusivity and diversity by re-
inforcing weaker constituencies, changing its name, and opening up to new constituencies. At the same time, we
identify five issues which require further attention if the Mechanism is to remain an inclusive convergence space:
risk of a concentration of power; the role of NGOs; gender equality and generational balance; multiple identities
that cut across constituency categories; and, tensions related to sub-regions.
1. Introduction
The global food sovereignty movement emerged in the late 1990s in
reaction to the liberalization of agricultural trade and the expansion of
a capital-intensive, corporate-led, industrial model of agriculture
characterized by persistent rural poverty, hunger, displacement and
environmental degradation. In 1996, the transnational peasant move-
ment La Via Campesina introduced its concept of ‘food sovereignty’ to
those attending the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome. In a relatively
short period of time, food sovereignty gained traction with a wide range
of food producing rural constituencies – such as pastoralists, fishers,
Indigenous Peoples, agricultural workers – as well as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) who joined forces to demand the right of peoples
to define their own food and agriculture systems. As a movement of
movements, the global food sovereignty movement has, over the last
three decades, created and in different ways enforced, systems of ca-
tegorization to build unity and convergence between different partici-
pant movements, while negotiating and maintaining difference (Claeys
& Duncan, 2018a). It includes organizations and movements at trans-
national, regional, national and local levels from a variety of con-
stituencies. Some of the key actors that are organized at the transna-
tional level include: La Via Campesina (LVC), the International Union of
Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied
Workers' Associations (IUF), the World Alliance for Mobile Indigenous
Peoples (WAMIP), World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers
(WFF), World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP), or the International
Indian Treaty Council (IITC).
Actors in the global food sovereignty movement have made parti-
cular use of two tools. They have used constituency categories (e.g.
pastoralists, fishers, Indigenous Peoples, agricultural workers, small-
holder farmers, women and youth) to identify, protect, foster and
guarantee the autonomy of movements and organizations representing
different groups of people with distinct identities and lived realities.
They have also used quotas (e.g. gender, age, constituency and/or
geography) to protect diversity, prevent the consolidation of power,
and ensure the prioritized participation of affected or marginalized
groups within the Movement, notably over NGOs. The use of con-
stituencies and quotas has supported two distinct but related objectives
of the movement: alliances building and effective direct representation
in global policy-making spaces (Claeys & Duncan, 2018a).
For actors in the global food sovereignty movement, the UN
Committee on World Food Security (CFS, henceforth referred to as ‘the
Committee’) is arguably one of the most important global policy-
making spaces. In 2009, in the aftermath of the 2007-08 global food
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crisis, the Committee was reformed with the aim of becoming the most
prominent global arena where food security issues are discussed. A key
feature of the Committee is that it defines itself as a multi-stakeholder
platform, within which states, civil society, the private sector, philan-
thropic foundations, international organizations and research institutes
can identify issues and solutions to global hunger and food insecurity,
and jointly participate in the elaboration of policy recommendations for
national governments to take home (CFS, 2009). States, however, have
final decision-making power in cases where there is no consensus.
The Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples' Mechanism (CSM, hen-
ceforth also referred to as ‘the Mechanism’) is an autonomous and self-
organized space for a large diversity of movements and organizations
usually designated as Civil Society Organizations2 (CSOs). We conceive
of the Mechanism as a convergence space. Indeed, the role of the Me-
chanism is ‘to facilitate the participation of CSOs in the work of the
Committee, including input to negotiation and decision-making’ and to
‘provide a space for dialogue’ (CFS, 2010, para. 4). A key practice of the
Mechanism is to develop and defend common policy positions in the
work of the Committee. In relation to the Committee, the Mechanism is
thus most often treated as a single actor. Internally, however, the im-
portance of diversity is recognized. The Founding Document of the
Mechanism states that ‘[p]articipation within the CSM [the Me-
chanism] should aim to preserve unity and solidarity amongst CSOs,
but should not imply a flattening of the diversity that exists between
civil society in terms of objectives, strategies, and content’ (CFS, 2010).
Over the last decade, the Mechanism has emerged as a key site
where actors in the global food sovereignty movement converge to
influence policy outcomes. The Mechanism has demonstrated its ef-
fectiveness at bringing diverse movements together to collectively af-
firm an alternative vision in global food security debates, and to sig-
nificantly shape the policy work of the Committee (Brem-Wilson, 2015;
Duncan & Barling, 2012; Gaarde, 2017; Nora, 2017). Like the global
food sovereignty movement (Claeys & Duncan, 2018a), the Mechanism
has sophisticated governance rules in place that enable a diversity of
constituencies and sub-regions to converge, with attention to sectoral,
regional and gender balance. Within the Mechanism, these rules are
systematically and spatially implemented, as well as formalized and
institutionalized within the Committee.
In this paper, we explore the internal dynamics of the Mechanism as
a convergence space. In the literature, convergence spaces are defined
as ‘geographically dispersed social coalitions’ (Routledge, 2009, 1894)
that meet only sporadically in ‘moments of temporary but intense
network stabilization’ (Routledge & Cumbers, 2009, 97; see also; Juris,
2004) such as global fora or days of action. The Mechanism, in contrast,
is made of both virtual and material spaces that shape ongoing inter-
actions between CSOs and sustain convergence. These spaces include,
but are not restricted to: (a) the executive body of the Mechanism made
of the Coordination Committee and Advisory Group; (b) the policy
Working Groups where participating organizations in the Mechanism
discuss policy inputs into Committee processes; and (c) the Forum
where actors come together annually in Rome in advance of the Com-
mittee's annual sessions. Within these spaces, regional, gender and
constituency quotas are formally or informally enforced (and at times
contested), and serve as the underlying basis for collective visions of
convergence to emerge. Addressing a gap in the convergence literature
around inclusivity, we assess the extent to which quotas have worked as
effective tools to build unity while protecting diversity. We further
contribute to the growing literature on convergence spaces by
highlighting what changes and challenges occur when convergence is
situated and managed in relation to a more formal institutional space.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce our methods.
This is followed by a review of our analytic framework. We then present
the mandate of the Mechanism before analyzing three specific sites
where convergence happens through carefully governed processes. This
leads us to a discussion of the politics of inclusiveness and diversity
across processes of the Mechanism. Here we assess youth and women's
participation, as well the dynamics inside and across constituencies and
sub-regions as they play out within the Mechanism. Since our objective
is to assess how the Mechanism works internally, we do not discuss how
the Mechanism influences the Committee's policy outcomes, how these
policy outcomes are implemented on the ground or how Mechanism
processes take place at the grassroots level. We conclude with an as-
sessment of how the Mechanism is performing as a convergence space,
and the extent to which it is addressing two specific challenges we
identified: fragmentation and institutionalization.
2. Methods
This paper is based on an independent evaluation of the Mechanism
that we conducted in the first half of 2018.3 The evaluation employed a
combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection, and relied
on textual analysis, an online survey and semi-structured interviews. In
order to triangulate the data collected through the survey and inter-
views, and inform the research design, we undertook a strategic review
of Mechanism and Committee documents. We started by reviewing
previous evaluations and Annual Reports of the Mechanism and con-
sidered the documents produced by the Mechanism's Policy Working
Groups (WGs), as well as a number of key documents shared by the
Secretariat of the Mechanism and/or found on their website. We further
identified a list of 30 strategic documents which we validated with the
Mechanism's Secretariat as being of greatest relevance. These docu-
ments helped us assess how internal dynamics actually reflect or depart
from the operational logics agreed upon and defined in founding
documents.
The online survey was launched on 13 March 2018 and was open for
a total of 8 weeks.4 The survey was translated in the three working
languages of the Mechanism (English, Spanish and French) and took
about 30minutes to complete. The survey was sent out by the Me-
chanism's Secretariat to support legitimacy and response rate. Survey
questions were designed according to the three main objectives of the
independent evaluation, to which we added specific questions for re-
search purposes. These three objectives were: assessing internal dy-
namics, assessing relationships with other actors in the Committee, and
identifying key challenges for the future of the Mechanism in light of
the evolution of the Committee. We received a total of 82 responses.
The majority of responses (63%) were in English, while 22% responded
in Spanish and 15% in French. However, not everyone who responded
to the survey in English spoke English as a first language. We note that
the survey is not representative of the Mechanism but is fairly re-
presentative of a diversity of views within the Mechanism as it was
completed by all constituencies and all but two regions. However, some
biases need to be accounted for. We had no respondents from Central
Europe or West Asia, and Western Europe was over-represented. Fur-
ther, constituencies were not evenly covered with NGOs, Indigenous
Peoples and small-holder farmers over-represented, along with ob-
servers (including academics) (see Fig. 1). Some people selected more
than one constituency, highlighting possible tensions around the clarity
and application of constituencies that we discuss in our analysis. Of
respondents, 44% identified as female, 51% as male and 4% preferred2 The term ‘civil society organization’ is used as an umbrella term to refer to
both social movements and NGOs. NGOs are understood to be organizations
that represent a specific issue or theme or the interests of certain social groups.
In contrast, social movements are recognized as self-organized social actors
with a shared identity that have come together to represent their own interests
(Duncan, 2015, 101–2).
3 The report is available here: http://www.csm4cfs.org/csm-evaluation/CSM.
4 This survey was designed with input and support from Josh Brem-Wilson
and Nora McKeon.
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not to respond. The breakdown of ages was biased towards slightly
older participants with 19% above 65, 43% between 45 and 64, and
38% between 30 and 44. No one under the age of 30 completed the
survey.
In parallel to launching the online survey, and in consultation with
the Secretariat, we identified over 50 possible people to interview. We
set out to prioritize interviews based on knowledge, needs and re-
presentation (i.e., gender, constituency, region, language and age), as
well as taking into account different roles that actors play within the
Mechanism (e.g. Coordination Committee, Advisory Group, Working
Groups, facilitators of Working Groups, and Forum participants). We
also identified non-Mechanism actors (i.e., governments and relevant
agencies). In total, 46 interviews5 were conducted between March and
June 2018: 35 people directly involved in the Mechanism, including 21
people who had been Coordination Committee members between 2014
and 2018 (7 had also served on the Advisory Group); 7 government
representatives; and 4 representatives from other participant categories
to the Committee. Interviews were conducted in English, French and
Spanish, predominantly over the phone or via Skype. Interviews lasted
between 45minutes and 2 hours. All participants gave verbal consent to
participate in the evaluation.6 We recorded, transcribed and anon-
ymized all interviews. Seven people preferred to submit their answers
in writing.
In addition, our analysis builds on regular periods of participant
observation in the Committee since 2009. Our long-term involvement
in the Mechanism as scholar-activists enabled us to give life to the data
collected in the framework of the evaluation, and to provide a rich and
ethnographic analysis of the ‘everyday life’ of the Mechanism (Billo &
Mountz, 2016, 206).
3. Analytic framework: convergence spaces
The Mechanism represents a convergence space (both physical and
virtual) for CSOs from around the world that focus on food sovereignty,
food security and nutrition, and the right to food. As noted by
Routledge (2017, 97), the notion of convergence space provides a
conceptual framework with which to interpret the operational and
spatial dynamics, strategies, practices and governance arrangements of
‘place-based movements and groups involved in extending their reach’.
Scholars have identified seven characteristics of convergence spaces
(Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008; Routledge, 2009). In this
paper, we make use of these characteristics to frame our analysis of the
Mechanism and its internal tensions as mediated by the implementation
of constituencies and quotas.
The first characteristic of convergence spaces is that they are com-
prised of place-based, but not necessarily place-bound, movements
(Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 193). The strength of these
movements comes from their local, national or regional embeddedness,
and not global level connections (see also Sklair, 1995). Actors in a
convergence space have individual and collective identities grounded in
their own sense of locality or community. They therefore have to find a
balance between specific needs and actions that are embedded in par-
ticular places or territories, and building spatially extensive coalitions.
The second characteristic is that within convergence spaces, actors
articulate certain collective visions, unifying values or organizational
principles which serve as the ‘common ground’ that is required to
generate a politics of mutual solidarity (Cumbers, Routledge, and
Nativel 2008, 193). Ideally, these collective visions are representative
of prefigurative politics (Routledge & Cumbers, 2009, 93; see also;
Graeber, 2002) meaning that they prefigure a participatory and hor-
izontal way of practicing politics, without a single organization or
ideology dominating. The articulation of shared values (that approx-
imate universalist politics) runs the risk of creating homogenous activist
environments that elide important issues of diversity or obliterate dif-
ferences between movements concerning practices of gender, class,
caste and ethnicity. This can generate important tensions or conflicts
within convergence spaces.
Third, convergence spaces necessitate a relational politics of soli-
darity between movement actors (Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel
2008, 194). In this respect, convergence spaces do not simply bring
different actors together, they are ‘generative, actively shaping political
identities’ (Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 194). Fourth, the
practices of solidarity-building in convergence spaces are uneven due
not only to inequalities between and across movements but also as a
result of different geographies in which these movements are located
(Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 195). As such, convergence
spaces facilitate spatially extensive political action. Importantly, this
means that convergence spaces can become dominated by the politics of
particular movements, with some places or movements becoming em-
powered and others marginalized.
The fifth characteristic is the presence of, and need for, ‘grass-
roooting vectors’ (Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 196). These
vectors conduct most of the ‘ideational labour’ (Routledge, 2017, 104):
they ground the ideas or imaginary of convergence spaces locally, in
places where there is active membership of participant movements. In
practice, these vectors do the work of translating and communicating
Fig. 1. Constituency identity of survey respondents (online survey Q 2).
5 Ten of these interviews were conducted and transcribed by our colleague
Josh Brem-Wilson to support the independent evaluation of the Mechanism.
6 We separately and explicitly asked permission to use the data collected for
the evaluation for research purposes.
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between the convergence space and the communities (Cumbers,
Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 196), providing the ‘communicative in-
frastructure’ (Routledge & Cumbers, 2009, 99). They also tend to con-
centrate skills, experience, resource access and mobility, which makes
them hold disproportionate power and influence within the network
(Routledge, 2017).
Sixth, convergence spaces are characterized by a range of different
operational logics (Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 196), in-
cluding horizontal and vertical logics. As noted by Routledge and
Cumbers (2009, 100) in the case of global justice movements, the
networking logic ‘is always entangled with more vertical practices as a
result of traditional movement structures, power relations inherent
within and between participant movements, and the role played by key
network actors within the convergence space’.
Finally, convergence spaces are marked by contested social and
power relations that relate to ‘differential control of and access to re-
sources’, which can give rise to ‘problems of representation, mobility
and cultural difference’ (Cumbers, Routledge, and Nativel 2008, 196).
In addition, convergence spaces are comprised of groups with: a) po-
tentially conflicting goals (forms of social change); b) potentially con-
flicting ideologies (gender, class, ethnicity); and, c) potentially con-
flicting strategies (institutional/legal and extra-institutional/illegal
forms of protest), all of which can generate tensions.
This seventh characteristic is, in many ways, the starting point of
our inquiry. As we showed elsewhere (Claeys & Duncan, 2018a), a key
rationale for establishing quotas and constituencies within the Me-
chanism was to address power relations, particularly with regard to
representation, in order to manage difference and protect diversity. In
this paper, we analyze this seventh characteristic in dialogue with the
first two (which relate to the roles of identities and territorially em-
bedded struggles), to assess how identity politics play out in the Me-
chanism. The Mechanism has implemented strict governance rules that
facilitate the inclusion and enhance the salience of identities articulated
around constituencies, regions/territories, and to some extent gender
and age. These diverse identities give the Mechanism its legitimacy
since the Mechanism is valued within the Committee for its ability to
bring to the fore the lived experiences of those affected by hunger and
food insecurity. Yet, the literature raises concerns around identity-
based organizing and the impulse towards creating separate organiza-
tions within movements around specific identities, such as women or
youth. Giving visibility to and reinforcing distinct identities presents a
challenge insofar as focusing on ‘identity politics’ has been shown to
have potentially balkanizing effects (Weldon & Laurel, 2006, 111).
Identity politics are also blamed for weakening social movements and
reducing their effectiveness by inducing the specialization and frag-
mentation of the actors involved (Gitlin, 1995; Harvey, 1996; Tarrow,
1998; Taylor & Whittier, 1999). To the contrary, other social move-
ments scholars have argued that the creation of separate spaces can be
critical to empowering and engaging marginalized groups, and can
make movements more inclusive and influential in policy discussions
(Weldon & Laurel, 2006, 113). We pay particular attention to the risk of
fragmentation in our analysis of the Mechanism below.
We also expand on these seven characteristics to consider the spe-
cific challenges that emerge from the institutionalization of con-
vergence spaces. Much of the work on convergence spaces has looked at
how movements of movements create collective political identities
across space, generate solidarity, and help activists develop ‘transna-
tional networks of support as an operational strategy for the defense of
their place(s)’ (Routledge, 2017, 97). Here we instead focus on con-
vergence as a process by which actors can gain influence and have
impact in a specific global policy process. Within social movement
theory, institutionalization can refer to movements that operate within
social institutions and organizations (Staggenborg, 2013). It can also
refer to the process of movements becoming established interest groups,
formalized and professionalized in relation to the fields within which
they operate. When it comes to the Mechanism, both are relevant.
First, the Mechanism operates within and across the formal policy-
making space of the Committee. This means, for example, that the use
of constituencies and quotas by the Mechanism is now integrated into
the Committee's governance structure. Indeed, the Committee has en-
dorsed and largely adopted the constituency approach to civil society
participation developed by the global food sovereignty movement (and
more specifically by the International Planning Committee for Food
Sovereignty (IPC)). We have also seen the uptake and institutionaliza-
tion of this approach within the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) (Claeys & Duncan, 2018a). As we have shown elsewhere (Duncan
& Claeys, 2018), the organizational logics and values of the (radical)
global food sovereignty movement have been formalized (albeit hor-
izontally) and ritualized through the Mechanism. Developed through
trial and error over three decades, these organizational logics have
provided a stable and transparent governance structure across the
movement, while always entailing a dynamic process of categorization
in which food sovereignty actors could constantly reassess which or-
ganizations and actors had the legitimacy to play political roles (Claeys
& Duncan, 2018a). From the literature, the concern would be that the
institutionalization of movement practices into the formal organiza-
tional logic of the Committee could limit the scope of adaptation and
adjustment necessary to ensure the inclusion of those who may feel
unrepresented (Weldon, 2012, 158). Further, scholars have pointed out
that power relations can become embedded in these institutionalized
organizational arrangements, making it easier for some actors to con-
solidate power (Davis, McAdam, Richard Scott, & Zald, 2005).
Second, the institutional context in which actors in the Mechanism
operate can direct social movements in more professionalized direc-
tions, leading them to internalize preexisting rules, and engage more in
institutionalized or ‘insider’ tactics rather than in disruptive direct ac-
tion (Kriesi, 1996; Zald and McCarthy 1987). As they become pro-
fessionalized, social movement actors may choose to pursue more ra-
tionalized/targeted goals, possibly at the expense of more ambitious
goals and revolutionary agendas (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). They may
also become co-opted if norm-making proceeds along channels and is-
sues determined by preexisting interests (Piven and Cloward 1978).
Evidence from the human rights movement's engagement with the UN
system, for example, shows that while professionalization increases
influence and impact, over-professionalization and attendant coopta-
tion are important pitfalls for movements to consider (Tsutsui,
Whitlinger, & Lim, 2012).
4. The Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism and its
mandate
Since its creation, the Mechanism has facilitated the active and
consistent participation of a large diversity of CSOs at the Annual
Sessions of the Committee (the number of organizations registered for
these sessions has varied between 81 and 123 between 2013 and 2017).
The strong commitment of participating organizations has enabled the
Mechanism to consistently produce well-prepared contributions as well
as clear and constructive policy proposals. In turn, the Mechanism is
recognized as a key actor in the Committee by a broad range of member
states and participants.
Speaking with a unified voice, the Mechanism has won a number of
important political victories, signaled by the uptake and adoption of
several of its proposals during policy negotiations. Examples of some of
the recent achievements identified by actors in the Mechanism include:
successfully negotiating the inclusion of agroecology to the Multi-Year
Program of Work (MYPOW) 2018–2019, water recommendations
(2015), a strong presence at the Committee's Forum on Women's em-
powerment in the context of food security and nutrition (2017), the
process of monitoring the Voluntary Guidelines for the Right to
Adequate Food (2018), successfully negotiating strong and progressive
language in outcomes such as Connecting small-holders to markets
(2016), and working towards the use, application and monitoring of the
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Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land, Fisheries
and Forests (VGGTs) (from 2012 onwards).
The Mechanism is supported by a stable and highly competent
Secretariat7 and has managed to secure a relatively substantial budget
(see Fig. 2). The Mechanism has the goal of 100% public funding from
member states (Interview 37). This is rationalized on the basis of the
nature of the Committee, which is a public body. Over the years, the
Mechanism has succeeded in increasing its share of public funding
(Interviews 37 and 38). Between 2011 and 2016, 84% of the total
budget of the Mechanism came from governments and international
organizations and 16% from NGOs and CSOs, with these figures
reaching 91% and 9% respectively in 2017.
The 2018 budget was divided as follows: Mechanism's consultations
at sub-regional or constituency level 23%; Annual Forum of the
Mechanism 21%; Secretariat and monitoring 20%; Policy Working
Groups of the Mechanism 17%; Participation in meetings of the
Committee's Advisory Group 11%; Accountability, audit and adminis-
trative costs 8%.
The governance structure of the Mechanism is grounded across
three main spaces: the Coordination Committee (the executive space)
and Advisory Group; the Policy Working Groups (the policy space); and
the Annual Forum (the gathering space) (see Fig. 3). The main objective
of this complex governance structure is to give leadership and control to
social movement organizations representing the ‘most affected’. One
implication of this is that there is no formal space within the Me-
chanism for those who are affected by food insecurity but not orga-
nized. In what follows we review the internal dynamics at play in each
of these spaces, before discussing how the Mechanism has balanced
diversity and inclusiveness and addressed the challenges of fragmen-
tation and institutionalization.
4.1. Executive space: the Coordination Committee and Advisory Group
The Mechanism is governed by a Coordination Committee re-
sponsible for ensuring that the functions of the Mechanism are carried
out according to its organizing principles. The Coordination Committee
is also responsible for ensuring that there is effective two-way com-
munication with participants worldwide. The Coordination Committee
is composed of 24 Constituency Coordinators (four Coordinators from
smallholder family farmer organizations and two from each of the 10
other constituencies (see Fig. 3) and 17 Sub-Regional Coordinators.
Extra coordination positions are given to small-scale farmers because
they represent 80% of the food insecure worldwide and are the largest
group of food producers (CFS, 2010). At a political level, these extra
positions also reflect the influence of agrarian movements (particularly
La Via Campesina) in the development of the executive structure at the
time of the Committee's reform.8
The involvement of NGOs in the Mechanism is severely constrained
by the Mechanism's governance structure which is grounded in the
‘most affected principle’ (Duncan & Claeys, 2018), and prioritizes the
engagement of social movements over NGOs. This is a key characteristic
of the Mechanism, as one of our interviewees explained:
The diversity of those who consider themselves mostly social movements
(…) really have the leading voice in the space. The diversity is recognized
in the 11 perhaps 12 constituencies, and NGOs are just one of them. I
think that is very, very important and this is structurally recognized and
operationalized in the space such as the CSM [the Mechanism]
(Interview 44).
Coordinators are appointed for a period of two years, with possible
renewal for another two years. Coordinators act as ‘networking vectors’
for the Mechanism and concentrate a lot of information, expertise,
material and symbolic resources. Within the Mechanism, they occupy a
predominantly virtual space, connecting via email, WhatsApp and on-
line meeting tools (e.g. Skype) or through reports. The political process
of appointing Coordinators is heavy and time consuming. The election
of Coordination Committee members takes places through autonomous
and independent processes decided internally by each of the respective
constituencies and sub-regions (CFS, 2010). Each constituency and re-
gion is tasked with ensuring it reaches out to the organizations re-
presenting the most affected in its network or region, and elections
usually take place electronically. In practice, the Coordination Com-
mittee supports the accountability of the wider Mechanism in so far as it
has the role of ensuring that the lists of participating organizations
provided by Coordination Committee members for their constituencies
and sub-regions are inclusive and representative of organizations con-
ducting relevant work on the ground (Interview 38). This is no simple
endeavor:
The first step therefore, for all the processes, in each of the global con-
stituencies and in the sub-regions is to have a list of participating orga-
nizations. That's the very first step, which is technically totally easy, but
politically is the point where you exclude or include people (Interview
10).
In terms of geographic representation of the Constituency
Coordinators, there has been improved distribution when comparing
the 2015–2017 Constituency Coordinators to the 2017–2019 ones (see
Fig. 4). At the same time, there is a perception that actors from the
Global North are over-represented in activities of the Mechanism (e.g.
Annual Forum, Working Groups). While this may be the case for some
activities (discussed in more detail below), participants from the Global
North are not over-represented when it comes to the executive structure
of the Mechanism, in line with the principles of its Founding Document.
When reviewing the primary constituency affiliation of Sub-
Regional Coordinators, we see that farmers' networks and NGOs are
over-represented (see Fig. 5). Despite the application of strict quotas in
the appointment of Constituency Coordinators, the autonomy left to
sub-regions in the appointment of their Coordinators results in a dis-
proportionate number of Sub-Regional Coordinators coming from
farmer organizations (and to a lesser extent NGOs), at the expense of
other constituencies. This imbalance could lead – and possibly already
has led – to a consolidation of power and influence in favour of small-
scale farmers’ organizations, which could threaten the constituency
balance of the Mechanism. We come back to constituency and sub-re-
gional dynamics below.
One key role for the Coordination Committee is to sit on the
Advisory Group of the Committee. According to the Committee's
Reform Document, the function of the Advisory Group is to contribute
substantive work and provide advice to the Bureau (the executive
branch of the Committee). The Advisory Group is composed of re-
presentatives from civil society, the private sector, philanthropic
foundations, international research institutes and international orga-
nizations. The Mechanism has four seats on the Advisory Group. The
rationale for this decision is the Committee's reform focus on prior-
itizing the voices of those most affected, as well as recognition for the
diversity of global civil society. However, this is a point of contention
for other Committee participants, notably the private sector, which only
have one seat.
7 According to the Founding Document of the Mechanism (CFS, 2010), the
Secretariat provides support to members of the Mechanism, the Coordination
Committee, civil society members of the Advisory Group and to help organize
the annual Civil Society Forum. The Secretariat reports to the Coordination
Committee. It is supposed to be politically neutral and to not perform advocacy
and lobbying roles. In recent years, the Mechanism's Secretariat has placed
strong emphasis on enforcing due processes, with a view to improving trust,
transparency and accountability in activities of the Mechanism and reducing
internal conflict.
8 The involvement of food sovereignty actors in the reform process of the
Committee and their leadership in the establishment of the Mechanism has been
discussed elsewhere. See, for example (Brem-Wilson, 2016; Claeys & Duncan,
2018a; Duncan, 2015; Gaarde, 2017; Nora, 2014).
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Since 2017, the members of the Mechanism that sit on the Advisory
Group consist of 10 elected Coordinators, rotating into the four as-
signed seats. The Terms of Reference for Advisory Group members
outline that at least 75% of the ‘official four’ Advisory Group members
need to be from social movements. It is interesting to note that this ratio
of 75% is not at all proportional to the ratio of social movements to
NGOs in the Coordination Committee. This can probably be explained
by pragmatic reasons, considering that sitting on the Advisory Group is
time consuming and NGOs are likely to have greater capacity and re-
sources to fulfil the function. The number of Coordinators rotating on
the Advisory Group used to be 8, but was increased to 10 to allow for
more sub-regional diversity. Indeed, the issue of sub-regional balance
on the Advisory Group has been historically sensitive for the
Mechanism. These tensions have been addressed by allowing all regions
to contribute to the Advisory Group, and clarifying that the Advisory
Group is not a place where organizations are to push for their own
interests. This is a useful example of how the Coordination Committee
identified a flexible solution to address inner tensions within the
parameters of its institutionalized governance structure.
4.2. Policy space: working groups
The reformed Committee produces policy recommendations to
support member countries make progress towards food security. To
promote dialogue and common positions amongst CSOs and to be most
effective in influencing these policies, the Mechanism established
Fig. 2. Annual budget of the Mechanism 2013–2018
Fig. 3. Working structure of the mechanism.
Source: Adapted from the Annual Report 2016–2017 of the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM, 2017)
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Working Groups. Most Working Groups mirror the policy-focused
Open-Ended Working Groups or Technical Task Teams of the
Committee (e.g. Water, Sustainable Development Goals, Connecting
Small-holders to Markets), although some are specifically geared to-
wards specific needs or internal purposes of the Mechanism (e.g.
Governance, Finance, etc.). The latter tend to be more transversal and
enduring (Interview 1). The analysis below covers both, with particular
attention to Policy Working Groups.
The Policy Working Groups are open to all CSOs working on food
security and nutrition. Anyone interested in participating in a Working
Group can contact the relevant Working Group Coordinator and/or
facilitator whose names and contact details are listed on the website of
the Mechanism. While there are no strict quotas in place for the com-
position of Working Groups, there is strong awareness of the im-
portance of ensuring diverse participation in Working Groups, and
Working Group facilitators see this as part of their task. When asked if
constituencies and regions provide some kind of template for the
composition of Working Groups, one interviewee replied:
Exactly. You just screen it through: it's like a checklist. ‘Is everybody
there of those who should be there?’ (Interview 44).
This informal implementation of constituencies and quotas has
worked as an effective convergence strategy. As highlighted by one
interviewee:
The funny thing in the CSM [the Mechanism] is that we do not really
fight over positions. We have actually a huge diversity. Yes, but we don't
have on content, we don't have these huge fights inside. (…) we have
mostly united positions and we are struggling like more on other issues:
our internal power struggle (Interview 10).
Over the years, the Working Groups have developed as the heart of
the Mechanism.9 Through Working Groups, participants have shown
high levels of commitment and engagement, demonstrating a will-
ingness to learn and work as a collective. There is a strong sense of
community in the Working Groups, along with a shared purpose. Many
interviewees spoke about the ability of Working Group participants to
function as a group and speak as one voice rather than pursue the
visibility of their own organization. However, this lack of individual or
organizational visibility, in favour of a coherent collective position, can
be a challenge, particularly for organizations such as NGOs that have
Fig. 4. Geographic affiliation of constituency Coordinators (2015–2017, 2017–2019).
Fig. 5. Constituency affiliation of Sub-Regional Coordinators (2015–2017, 2017–2019).
9 For a list of current and past Working Groups, see http://www.csm4cfs.org/
policy-working-groups/.
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visibility requirements (i.e. who need to have their name and related
branding associated with particular processes) (Interviews 35 and 36).
As explained by one interviewee who works with an NGO and has fa-
cilitated a number of Working Groups:
NGOs … should facilitate the most affected by food security and nutri-
tion to take their place, and play their role, and so this has several im-
plications, because you really have to reduce a bit your visibility, or your
tendency to be there on the frontline, and do a lot of working supporting
the others (Interview 36).
The Working Groups are led by one or two social movement
Coordinators from the Coordination Committee and supported by a
technical facilitator, usually from an NGO. Both Coordinators and fa-
cilitators fulfil their roles on a voluntary basis. Their names are pro-
posed by Working Groups members and must be approved by
Coordination Committee members. Within the Mechanism,
Coordinators and facilitators have found creative ways of working to-
gether to be able to react to the demands of the Committee. Social
movements and NGOs are mutually accountable (Interview 5) and their
collaboration builds on their respective strengths. As Coordinators of
the Working Groups, social movements give political orientation, which
is fundamental. In this sense, the Coordinators serve as grassrooting
vectors, connecting the global to the local, but also as ‘grassrootifying
vectors’ ensuring representation of sub-regional movements in the
global convergence space. The political leadership provided by social
movements was recognized by one of our interviewees from an NGO
who has facilitated a number of Working Groups:
Yes, the job of the facilitator in working groups has been an extremely
strong learning experience on how to translate these bulky boring tech-
nical things into very simple political things. Then to have this reliable
group of political people from social movements, following the big poli-
tical minds. Then it was very important to be able to always check with
them, ‘Okay, now these are the crossroads. We go like this, or we go that
way? This means this or that for our big political line?’ ‘Okay, we go
better like this.’(Interview 7)
Facilitators, who were described to us in one interview as ‘mid-
wives’, are of paramount importance to the functioning of Working
Groups (Interview 1). Without facilitators' time, commitment and re-
sources, Working Groups would not function and the quality of out-
comes would not be as high. Several interviewees highlighted that high
quality contributions10 have been central to ensuring the influence of
the Mechanism in policy negotiations, thus recognizing the important
contribution of both social movements and NGOs. Talking about
Working Groups, one of our interviewees who previously sat on the
Coordination Committee explained:
They're amazing for knowledge sharing and even co-creation. I think
that's worked really well when you have a [social movement]
Coordinator and a Technical Support. I think that's new. When you have
that, when you've got somebody with experience and capacity. ….
[laughs] It's a great asset to the group to have technical support
(Interview 5).
However, many facilitators described their work as ‘lonely at times’,
with a lot of ‘chasing’ to ensure that social movements' views are re-
presented (Interviews 1, 7, 34 and 36). Some facilitators noted that they
often feel uncomfortable and guilty trying to push movement actors for
inputs, recognizing that many are busy with other, perhaps more
pressing, issues. One interviewee from an NGO who is a facilitator for a
number of Working Groups explained:
I also feel a bit guilty sometimes. I'm chasing people because they have to
give approval, but I know they're so busy and it's … You don't really
know what to do. There's nothing else to do (Interview 1).
Facilitators have developed and implemented a range of creative
strategies for ensuring social movements’ inputs, including email,
Skype, phone calls, in-person meetings, Facebook, WhatsApp, and
writing draft contributions on the basis of conversations (Interview 35).
Most Working Groups have developed the use of various layers of ar-
ticulation. Depending on the decisions that need to be made, certain
issues are discussed bilaterally between Coordinators and facilitators
while some issues are discussed with a core group. The results of either
or both processes are then shared with all Working Group members.
Levels of engagement in the Working Groups naturally depend on
the issues in question. Some themes appear to attract less interest from
social movements (e.g. Sustainable Development Goals, monitoring,
evaluation of the Committee), or attract certain constituencies more
specifically (e.g. forestry, livestock), while some are perceived as too
technical (e.g. nutrition). Issues like land tenure and agroecology tend
to attract wide interest and participation from social movements.
Technically, a quota system could be enforced in the Working Groups if
social movement voices are not well represented (CSM, n.d.). To our
knowledge, no Working Group has implemented such actions, despite
the imbalances between participating organizations. There are two
reasons for this. First, Working Group Coordinators and facilitators
seem to have found ways to ensure that social movements' views are
adequately portrayed within Working Groups, despite their unequal or
sub-optimal presence or participation. This is confirmed by our survey,
which showed that 70% of those surveyed feel that social movements’
views are well prioritized in policy Working Groups (Online survey
Q28). Second, there is awareness, within Working Groups, of the im-
portance of maintaining a balance between strictly enforcing quotas
and leaving Working Groups open to those who have the ability and
eagerness to participate (Interview 20).
In addition, active participation in Working Groups requires in-
vesting a lot of time and effort, and this can consolidate the expertise
and power of certain people. Facilitation work, in particular, tends to be
concentrated in the hands of a few dedicated individuals, often involved
in several Working Groups. Social movement actors, including
Coordinators, also tend to spread their limited time and resources
across several Working Groups. Some interviewees made references to a
few social movement ‘rock stars’ who cover a range of international
meetings or leadership responsibilities for their organizations
(Interview 1). We found that there is some discrepancy between the
policy work taking place in the Working Groups, where not all social
movements are actively engaged and present, and the internal issues
that are discussed in the Coordination Committee, where, as a result of
strict quota enforcement and dedicated funding, social movements are
more consistently present.
4.3. Gathering space: The Annual Forum
The Annual Forum takes place in Rome and is the face-to-face
meeting for all CSOs interested in participating in the Mechanism and
the Committee. When it comes to the Forum, we were not able to
systematically assess the balance of constituencies, sub-regions, gender
and youth, nor the evolution of participation over time, due to the
absence of reliable data. While personal data is collected by the
Mechanism's Secretariat for registration purposes since most meetings
take place within FAO premises, such data is structured in a way that
primarily responds to FAO accreditation requirements, not internal
needs.11 One important element, however, needs to be highlighted here
10 High quality contributions here refer to documents which are perceived by
other participants in the Committee as being professional and constructive to
the pertinent negotiations.
11 Data collection is further impeded by last minute changes in re-
presentatives sent by participating organizations, cancellations associated with
declined visas, illnesses and other events, and the lack of capacity of the
Mechanism's Secretariat around the time of the Committee's plenary.
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in relation to participation. Participating in the activities of the Me-
chanism and the Committee is costly, and the Mechanism's budget is
only able to cover the participation of members of the Coordination
Committee, in line with the quota system in place for the Coordination
Committee. Beyond the Coordination Committee, participation is thus
constrained by/dependent on the ability of organizations to self-fund
their attendance. According to our interviews, the proportion of funded
versus self-funded participants was about 50/50 at the last Forum (In-
terviews 37 and 38), which indicates that diversity (and the political
commitment to prioritizing social movement voices) can only be en-
sured for about half of the total number of Forum participants. For the
other half, the over-representation of participants from the Global
North, NGOs, research institutions or more resourced organizations is
difficult to avoid given that they tend to be more able to finance their
participation.
In addition, the Mechanism's Secretariat has not been able to ensure
a balance of constituencies and regions and enforce gender and age
quotas at the Forum, due to lack of capacity. This limitation has been
compensated by a strong emphasis on specific methodologies im-
plemented during the Forum that prioritize the voices of social move-
ments' representatives. Efforts have also been made in the past to reach
out to specific constituencies in relation to certain policy processes (e.g.
protracted crises).
5. Discussion: the governance structures of the mechanism for
inclusiveness and diversity
In this section, we further assess the overall ability of the
Mechanism to operate as a convergence space that protects and en-
hances inclusiveness and diversity, while addressing power imbalances.
As we showed in the first part of this article, constituencies and quotas
have functioned as effective tools to facilitate the participation of a
diversity of voices. Linking policy to territorially-embedded and place-
based struggles, the operational logics of the Mechanism have enhanced
its legitimacy and fostered convergence in the executive, policy and
gathering spaces of the Mechanism. Yet, inner tensions and power re-
lations remain vivid. Below, we focus on recent developments and
identify three areas of progress and five areas of concern.
Since 2014, the Coordination Committee of the Mechanism has
taken concrete steps towards increasing the diversity and inclusiveness
of the Mechanism, and addressing power relations. First, the Secretariat
and Coordination Committee have paid specific attention to reinforcing
weaker or less active constituencies and addressing imbalances in the
representation of different constituencies (i.e., missing constituency
Coordinators) with an emphasis on the Women, Youth and Landless
constituencies (Interviews 19 and 38). These three constituencies have
benefited from specific budget allocations in order to allow for physical
meetings outside of the annual meetings in Rome. This appears to have
brought substantive results, and the Women, Landless and Youth con-
stituencies all appear to have been invigorated. All three constituencies
have undertaken visioning exercises to help participants develop a
shared agenda and identify common objectives.
Second, in 2018, the Indigenous Peoples constituency, represented
by the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), requested a name
change for the Mechanism in order to ensure the full participation of
Indigenous Peoples and the consistent application of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in UN policy processes.
The request was discussed at the Coordination Committee meeting in
July 2018 and consensus was rapidly achieved, resulting in a change
from the original name, the ‘Civil Society Mechanism’, to the new
name, the ‘Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism’(CSM,
2018). From our interviews with Indigenous Peoples' representatives,
we understand that it is important for Indigenous Peoples to have their
own identity when navigating the UN system and that some feared that
the ‘civil society’ terminology, which does not fit well with Indigenous
Peoples' own institutions, could passively marginalize Indigenous
Peoples (Interview 17). One of our interviewees from the Indigenous
Peoples constituency even expressed discomfort with the idea that In-
digenous Peoples should participate within the Mechanism as a con-
stituency. As our interviewee put it:
We have recognition of rights in the United Nations system as peoples, as
Indigenous Peoples not as sectors, not as sectors. So we propose that it be
a Mechanism of Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples. Because this is also
how Indigenous brothers and sisters from all over the world are more
comfortable in order to participate (Interview 12).
In our view, this decision to change the name of the Mechanism
reflects the high degree to which the Coordination Committee values
convergence and unity and has shown flexibility to avoid the frag-
mentation that would have resulted from the creation of a separate
Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism.
Third, the Mechanism has looked into the possibility of setting up a
new constituency of communities living in protracted crises, refugees
and internally displaced people. A Coordination Committee Working
Group was established to assess the usefulness and feasibility of the
proposal, and to assess whether the issues of protracted crises are
adequately covered, or not, by the existing constituencies. The Working
Group noted that communities living in protracted crises are a special
category that suffers from distinct social, economic and political phe-
nomena, including: destruction/breakdown of livelihoods, internal and
external displacement (i.e. refugees), high dependence on humanitarian
assistance, collapsed or dual governments (weak institutional capacity
at best), increased rate of morbidity and mortality, and decreased
longevity due to food crises. The Working Group also determined that
the existing constituencies do no cover the issues of protracted crises.
First, protracted crises situations have distinct challenges that do not
exist in other situations. Second, protracted crises situations have dis-
tinct underlying causes that need to be addressed. Third, protracted
crises fall outside of the typical categories for intervention including
non-crises development situations and short-term crises. The Working
Group also identified criteria for who would be recognized as part of
such a constituency. The Working Group submitted its conclusions and
the Coordination Committee must now decide on next steps. While it is
premature to draw any conclusions from this process, the attention paid
by the Mechanism to the importance of opening-up to a broader di-
versity of relevant actors shows that the Mechanism does not shy away
from questioning its own objectives and legitimacy. At the same time, it
should be noted that discussions around the creation of this new con-
stituency have been complex and contentious. As one interviewee from
the Coordination Committee noted:
We have been pushing to have an additional seat for communities suf-
fering from protracted crises/conflict/occupation. It was extremely dif-
ficult to push through initially, as not everyone suffers or comprehends
the severity of war. And perhaps there were other reasons. But now we
are in the right direction (Interview 22).
One of the reasons the discussions on the creation of this new
constituency were contentious is that they touched on the very nature
of the Mechanism as a space that prioritizes social movements' voices.
Indeed, it would be inadequate to say that the Mechanism facilitates the
participation of grassroots communities. The Mechanism is more ade-
quately described as a ‘political’ space that brings together social
movement leaders of organizations representing the affected. This
makes it particularly challenging for the Mechanism to facilitate the
participation of non-organized actors, as highlighted by one inter-
viewee currently sitting on the Coordination Committee:
the debate is long but it shows the difficulty in relation to your question,
we say to ourselves, yes, it is a constituency that is not represented as
such in the networks and that lives in situations of particular food in-
security and that are not supported by international networks, so we say
to ourselves yes, we must invest in it but the second question is how to
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ensure that it is the people who are in these situations who will belong to
these constituencies rather than NGOs who speak for them and then it
becomes more difficult to identify the organizations (Interview 15).
Based on the above analysis, we argue that the focus on separate
constituency and regional identities has enabled the autonomous but
converging expression of a diversity of identities within the Mechanism,
without leading to fragmentation. This finding echoes our assessment of
the global food sovereignty movement at large, wherein the protection
of a diversity of identities and perspectives has not led to fragmentation
but rather enabled the movement to come together and grow (Claeys &
Duncan, 2018a). We also argue that the Mechanism has identified ways
to enhance diversity despite the institutionalization of its governance
structure. At the same time, the complexity of the Mechanism's gov-
ernance structure remains an initial barrier to participation as it is
difficult to explain, in particularly to new Coordination Committee
members.
While we have shown how the Mechanism has successfully ad-
dressed a number of exclusions and power imbalances in recent years,
we have also identified five issues which may require more attention if
the Mechanism is to remain inclusive in the future. First, a number of
participants raised concerns about imbalances in power, influence, ca-
pacity and resources between various participating organizations
within the Mechanism. As highlighted above, some actors or organi-
zations appear over-represented within the Mechanism, either in the
Coordination Committee or in the Working Groups. We also heard
specific concerns about the important presence of La Via Campesina
within the Mechanism. La Via Campesina encompasses many con-
stituencies and is present in most Working Groups, and its involvement
is facilitated by a dedicated La Via Campesina support staff based in
Rome. From the interviews and survey, we heard many concerns that La
Via Campesina activists have a disproportionate amount of influence,
although we have no evidence that this influence has actually hindered
the participation of other networks or constituencies.
One of our interviewees from a regional network, who is also a
member of the Coordination Committee complained:
Another tension is the monopolization of spaces by La Via. (…) They
want to be in all groups and then they bring more and more people. When
organizations are smaller they can't move as many people. Then it is not
going to become a space of organizations but of one organization. That is
not possible for an open space (Interview 13).
At the same time, others noted that this presence is consistent with
the fact that La Via Campesina is the largest and most organized social
movement of food producers, and that many La Via Campesina re-
presentatives have accepted to take on leading roles and responsibilities
within the Mechanism. In addition, many view La Via Campesina's
active participation as key to the functioning of a strong Mechanism,
since La Via Campesina has a clear political stance on many issues
discussed at the Committee (Interviews 35 and 36).
We also found that while some constituencies are diverse, with
different organizational representatives taking on the role of
Coordinator, other constituencies were described as being under the
‘guardianship of particular organizations’ (Interview 1), with the asso-
ciated risk that some ‘heavy weight’ actors (Interview 7) dominate
certain processes/discussions. Some questions were also raised as to
whether leading organizations within the constituencies were doing
their best to reach out and include new organizations (Interview 8).
These disparities suggest that the Mechanism could more systematically
enforce the balance requirements that are at the heart of its governance
structures. At the same time, the existence of imbalances within the
Mechanism reflects disparities in how food producer social movements
are organized at regional and global levels, with some constituencies
being more organized and resourced than others. In addition, compe-
tition is inherent to the Mechanism as a policy convergence space be-
cause of the unique opportunities it provides to civil society actors
wishing to participate in transnational food security governance
(Tsutsui et al., 2012). As noted by other scholars, global civil society is a
competitive arena in which domestic organizations compete for scarce
international resources (Bartelson, 2006; Keane, 2003). This was con-
firmed by one of our interviewees and previous Coordination Com-
mittee member:
The dynamic of the fight for space or protection of space has been part of
the CSM [Mechanism] since the very beginning and plays out in all the
spaces, including the Working Groups and the CC [Coordination
Committee] (Interview 5).
In short, constituencies and quotas have so far proven to be effective
tools to limit the consolidation of power within the Coordination
Committee and the Mechanism at large. At the same time, the
Mechanism is not devoid of power dynamics and it will be important for
the Mechanism to address these in the future, even if these dynamics
are perceived as legitimate by many of its participants.
Second, NGOs play roles in the Mechanism that are not necessarily
aligned with the founding principles of the Mechanism. As discussed
above, NGOs are recognized as one of the 11 constituencies and sit on
the Coordination Committee. Yet, in practice many NGOs function
more in support of the other constituencies than as a distinct con-
stituency in and of themselves. As one interviewee explained, this
support role is the outcome of a mutual or self-selection process and of
the explicit alignment of some NGOs with the objectives of food so-
vereignty (Interview 6). One interviewee from an NGO explained:
If one's lucky enough to be in a place [where you can have influence], I'm
completely conscious that I'm bringing with me in my mind the voice of
social movements. I will amplify their voices where I can but for the most
part that's also an accompanying role. I will sometimes use my, you could
say privilege or access, to open doors for social movements. Then
hopefully have them walk in (interview 5).
The NGO constituency is very heterogeneous, and it contains large
and small, international and national, Northern and Southern NGOs,
which do not all necessarily see their roles as one of support (Interview
35). At the same time, however, this support role is clearly embedded in
the ways in which the Working Groups function, since Working Groups
are led by a social movement Coordinator supported by a technical
facilitator from an NGO (as we discussed above). This support function
is positively assessed by participants, although some complain that the
support granted by NGOs is unevenly shared across social movements.
One interviewee from the Coordination Committee noted:
La Via does not need any NGOs. La Via is a huge movement; it's far
beyond needing any NGOs, or should be. If it is a movement, then it does
not need these NGOs. So, then, why is there such a close collaboration
between La Via and the NGOs? (Interview 4)
Our evaluation of social movement-NGOs relations within the
Mechanism uncovered a complex picture. On the one hand, the in-
volvement and influence of NGOs is considerably limited by the con-
stituencies and quota system that allocates them only two seats on the
Coordination Committee of the Mechanism: one for NGOs from the
Global North and one for NGOs from the Global South. On the other
hand, several processes within the Mechanism continue to rely on the
technical support of a key number of trusted NGOs, notably in Working
Groups. The contradiction is not lost on our interviewee who explained:
They keep on saying that NGOs are not real representatives. Fine. I agree.
But then, why did you have an NGO slot? Why are your technical ad-
visers from NGOs? [laughs] (Interview 4)
In the Mechanism, the social movement-NGO tandem appears to be
working effectively and, as a result, the place of NGOs on the
Coordination Committee is not questioned. This is surprising con-
sidering that a full commitment to prioritizing the voices of the orga-
nizations representing the most affected should, in theory, be translated
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into the exclusion of NGOs from the Coordination Committee.
Third, the Mechanism needs to engage in further efforts to achieve
generational balance and full gender equality. There is currently no
quota for youth, but attention has been paid in recent years to engage
more youth, notably through the consolidation of the youth con-
stituency (as discussed above). The lack of specific quotas to enhance
youth involvement in the Coordination Committee and Working Groups
(i.e. across constituencies and sub-regions and beyond the youth con-
stituency strictly speaking) is surprising, considering the importance of
enabling the participation of young leaders, and the increasing chal-
lenges relating to farm renewal and succession, rural employment and
barriers to entering farming for the younger generations. This situation
is however consistent with developments we have documented else-
where in the global food sovereignty movement, with youth quotas only
appearing in recent years (Claeys & Duncan, 2018a). We found that the
Coordination Committee is open to adopting a youth quota but that the
issue has not been granted top priority.
With regards to gender, participants positively assess gender bal-
ance across the activities of the Mechanism but some raised concerns
about men dominating discussions and speaking roles, or certain
Working Groups. An instance of sexual harassment was also reported to,
and adequately dealt with, by the Coordination Committee (Interview
42). The Secretariat and Coordination Committee of the Mechanism are
aware that they must continue efforts to uproot and deconstruct pa-
triarchal power relations within the Mechanism, beyond advocating for
women's rights in the Committee. Recent developments around gender
are promising and include the elaboration of a shared vision of the
women's constituency, the outcomes of the Women's Empowerment
Forum, attention to inclusive language in documents produced by the
Mechanism, and the development of shared values around gender.
In the case of both gender and youth, the Mechanism appears to
have prioritized the reinforcement of the Women and Youth con-
stituencies over the strict enforcement of gender and age quotas across
its activities. This approach has proven useful to give visibility to wo-
men's rights and the specific concerns of the youth, but is insufficient to
achieve full gender and generational equality across all activities.
Fourth, one limitation of the constituency approach is the issue of
multiple and hybrid identities that cut across constituencies. We found
that many actors who enter the Mechanism do not know which con-
stituency to join, or to which they ‘belong’. As one of our interviewees
explained:
A lot of people have clarity about the constituency, others a little bit less.
When it comes to self and definition, I think that not all of the partici-
pating organizations of the CSM [Mechanism] know which one is their
constituency even though maybe they are in the constituency list
(Interview 45).
The Mechanism's Secretariat has tackled this issue by allowing
constituencies to overlap (this is particularly true for the Women and
Youth constituencies, but to some extent for the Indigenous Peoples and
Pastoralist constituencies as well). The Secretariat has also addressed
this by encouraging actors to identify their ‘first political identity’, in
fact asking participants to choose between different aspects of their
identity for the sake of effective participation (Interview 45). While
most processes are, in practice, fluid enough to accommodate a di-
versity of identities, notably through the Working Groups, at the heart
of the Mechanism are important tensions between constituencies and
identities. While the Mechanism seeks to be a diverse and inclusive
space, the emphasis on convergence means that participants have to
engage in activities and processes through established constituencies.
This may explain why there has so far been no discussion within the
Mechanism about the possibility of facilitating the deliberate inclusion
of other identities or people/groups enduring other forms of dis-
crimination (e.g. (dis)abilities, caste, class, LGBTQI+, race, and re-
ligion).
Finally, the Mechanism has been plagued since its inception by
tensions between and inside its sub-regions. Despite improvements in
recent years, sub-regions remain a weaker, but crucially important,
component of the governance structure of the Mechanism. Participants
positively assess the current regional balance of the Coordination
Committee as well as across the Mechanism more broadly but there is
only limited engagement of actors from Asia (especially Central Asia),
West Asian countries, Portuguese-speaking countries, as well as from
across the African Continent. Concerns were raised that NGOs and ac-
tors from wealthy countries (particularly Western Europe) and Spanish-
speaking countries remain over-represented in the Mechanism. As
noted above, actors from Western Europe are not over-represented in
the executive Coordination Committee of the Mechanism. The
Coordination Committee has acknowledged that some sub-regions are
weak, with two regions particularly under-represented: Southern Africa
and Central Asia,12 and has deployed specific efforts to reach out to
organizations in these regions. It has also supported certain sub-regions
facing internal coordination challenges, such as South Asia. This sub-
region has so far failed to establish a list of national and regional CSOs
working on food security issues and to organize elections to appoint
representatives to the Coordination Committee. While exploring the
reasons behind the under-representations of certain sub-regions is be-
yond the scope of this paper, we note that regional tensions, internal
divisions and lack of organization could play a role in the ability of
CSOs to actively participate (Mills, 2018; Alonso-Fradejas, Borras,
Holmes, Holt-Giménez, & Jane Robbins, 2015; Borras, Edelman, & Kay,
2008; Edelman & Borras, 2016).
One body of the Mechanism where the issue of regional balance
remains particularly sensitive is the Coordination Committee, in part
because a number of Coordination Committee members are then se-
lected to sit on the Advisory Group of the Committee, which is seen as a
strategic space. To ensure maximum representation, in recent years, the
Coordination Committee decided that Constituency Coordinators must
be elected from global/continental organizations, such as La Via
Campesina (LVC), the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel,
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF),
World Alliance for Mobile Indigenous Peoples (WAMIP), World Forum
of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers (WFF), World Forum of Fisher
Peoples (WFFP), or the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC). As
for sub-Regional Coordinators, they must be representatives from na-
tional or regional organizations, such as the West African network of
peasants and small food producers ROPPA (Réseau des organizations
paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (original name in
French) or the Latin American agroecological movement MAELA
(Movimiento Agroecológico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (original
name in Spanish)). Although this new rule appears to be largely ac-
cepted and implemented, some expressed that it is unfair as it offers
more opportunities to global constituencies to sit permanently on the
Coordination Committee in so far as there are only a few global net-
works of constituencies, but several regional and national networks. In
the words of one interviewee from a regional network who sits on the
Coordination Committee:
It's not like it's very appropriate that organizations that are global have
more participation than others. It seems to me that this does not help
democratize a space that wants to be very inclusive (Interview 13).
We also found that Sub-Regional Coordinators do not appear to
have full clarity about their roles, the tools they can use, how they could
better support certain actors or constituencies within their sub-region,
and how they can facilitate the process of coordinating a sub-regional
agenda (Interviews 6 and 15). The role of Sub-Regional Coordinators is
potentially more complex than that of Constituency Coordinators due to
the diversity of views that they need to integrate, e.g. the need to
12We note a lack of survey respondents from these regions, as well as from
Eastern Europe.
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include representatives from all constituencies. As one interviewee and
facilitator of several Working Groups commented:
Regions really do function more as Working Groups. Because they're
responsible for disseminating information across a lot of different people.
In principle all of the NGOs, and CSOs, or whatever should be included,
that are under that region, if they want (Interview 1).
Yet, we see two reasons why reinforcing sub-regional articulation
(and Sub-Regional Coordinators) is important for the future of the
Mechanism. First, sub-regions are the main entry point to the
Mechanism for local and national-level organizations that cannot en-
gage through global constituencies. Second, sub-regions could poten-
tially play a key role in advancing the use, application and monitoring
of Committee's outcomes because sub-regions often share similar legal
and policy frameworks and the existence of regional bodies makes
advocacy at sub-regional level more effective (Interview 20).13 There
are financial constraints however to making this happen. We asked
participants in the Mechanism who completed the survey if they were
satisfied with the distribution of the budget, and many responded that
they would eventually like to see more resources go to regional and
constituency consultations if funding allows. This is echoed by inter-
viewees who point to the potential for the Mechanism to increase its
inclusiveness and outreach if more funds were made available for ac-
tivities at sub-regional level (Interview 15). Yet, the Mechanism is un-
likely to mobilize more financial resources in the near future.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we assessed how the Civil Society and Indigenous
Peoples' Mechanism operates as an inclusive convergence space with a
focus on constituencies and quotas as tools to protect and enhance di-
versity while preventing fragmentation. We also explored how the
Mechanism is managing its institutionalization in relation to the UN
Committee on World Food Security. One specific contribution of this
paper was to highlight the role of Constituency and Sub-Regional
Coordinators not just as ‘grassrooting vectors’ but as ‘grassrootifying
vectors’. The literature on convergence spaces shows that grassrooting
vectors are key because they ground the ideas or imaginary of con-
vergence spaces locally, in places where there is active membership of
participant movements. We showed how the work of grassrootifying is
also key to supporting legitimacy, as it ensures adequate representation
of place-based and identity-based movements and struggles in a global
governance arena.
A second contribution of this paper was to address a gap in the
literature when it comes to the inclusiveness of convergence spaces. As
we discussed, the complex governance structures of the Mechanism
have succeeded in achieving a good degree of sub-regional, con-
stituency and gender balance, making it a diverse and relatively in-
clusive space. The identification of primary constituencies and quotas
has played a key role in helping the Mechanism meet internal and ex-
ternal legitimacy requirements in terms of the diversity of views, in-
terests, perspectives and groups it represents. It has also imposed a
requirement of inclusiveness on the Mechanism, forcing civil society
participants to engage in cross-sectoral and cross-regional dialogue, and
ensuring each constituency has ‘adequate’ relative weight (i.e. re-
presentation). However, we have also shown how some sub-regions and
constituencies continue to struggle to engage effectively with the
Mechanism. Further, many participating organizations face important
challenges in opening up to, or linking up with, under-represented ac-
tors. Our analysis points to issues of capacity (notably language barriers
and lack of insertion in global networks), political divisions, power
dynamics, and competition among organizations trying so secure
exclusive access to an international forum. We also note a lack of or-
ganized movements representing the most affected in some sub-regions
or at the global level. Further research is needed into the obstacles and
challenges that actors who are currently under-represented face in
order to become further involved in the Mechanism.
A third contribution of this paper was to contribute to ongoing
debates around identity politics and how organizing around identity
lines may lead to social movement fragmentation. Contrary to what
some theories predict, we showed that the recognition of sectoral,
geographical, gender and age diversity has not fragmented the
Mechanism but instead enabled it to operate successfully as a con-
vergence space. At the same time, the Mechanism has left unaddressed
other identities (and potential grounds of discrimination) such as re-
ligion, race/ethnicity, class and caste, sexual orientation and/or gender
identity. There is currently no discussion within the Mechanism on the
need to recognize or include other groups (beyond the discussion
around protracted crises) and it is likely that the absence of specific
constituencies based on particular (especially marginalized) identities
makes people feel alienated (Gutmann, 2003) and prevents them from
participating. Outside of the Mechanism, La Via Campesina activists are
starting to denounce the fact that ‘the rights-based food sovereignty
movement, whilst defending a feminist agenda amongst small-scale
food producers, is not spared from the reproduction of sexist patterns’
(Gioia, forthcoming). As Gioia (forthcoming) argues, persons who do
not fit into heteronormative patterns are not explicitly mentioned in
movement declarations and key documents. This makes them invisible,
and hinders the adoption of a truly intersectional perspective. Further
research is needed into how some identities are empowered and others
are negated in the activities of the Mechanism, and on how this shapes
the politics of intersectionality within the Mechanism.
A fourth and final contribution of this paper relates to the in-
stitutionalization of convergence spaces, which to our knowledge has so
far not been discussed in the literature. Our analysis showed that the
codification of the constituencies and quotas approach within the
Committee has, so far, not prevented the Mechanism from reflecting on
how it might improve its governance structure to enhance its legitimacy
and address its own shifting dynamics. As the Mechanism continues to
professionalize, however, it will be useful to get a better understanding
of how budgets and financial flows affect internal dynamics within and
across the Mechanism. Discussions on funds remain very limited in the
literature on convergence despite the importance of funding in de-





We would like to thank all those who participated in and supported
this research, especially Josh Brem-Wilson, Nora McKeon, and the
Secretariat of the Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples' Mechanism,
Martin Wolpold-Bosein, Teresa Maisano and Luca Bianchi. We would
also like to thank the Coordination Committee members of the Civil
Society and Indigenous Peoples' Mechanism for providing feedback on
our analysis. Thanks are also extended to the four anonymous re-
viewers, as well as Nadia Lambek and Karine Peschard, for their con-
structive feedback. We must also thank Raoul, Isaac, Francis and Aidan
for being a great source of energy and motivation. The authors declare
that they received a nominal fee for conducting the independent eva-
luation of the Civil Society Mechanism (2018). The fee was used to
support data collection. This data later informed this paper.13 This issue is beyond the scope of this paper but we direct the reader to the
Civil Society Mechanism evaluation for more details (Claeys & Duncan, 2018b).
P. Claeys and J. Duncan Political Geography 75 (2019) 102045
12
References
Alonso-Fradejas, Alberto, Borras, Saturnino M., Jr., Holmes, Todd, Holt-Giménez, Eric, &
Jane Robbins, Martha (2015). Food sovereignty: Convergence and contradictions,
conditions and challenges. Third World Quarterly, 36(3), 431–448. https://doi.org/
10.1080/01436597.2015.1023567.
Bartelson, Jens (2006). Making sense of global civil society. European Journal of
International Relations, 12(3), 371–395. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1354066106067348.
Billo, Emily, & Mountz, Alison (2016). For institutional ethnography: Geographical ap-
proaches to institutions and the everyday. Progress in Human Geography, 40(2),
199–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132515572269.
Borras, Saturnino M., Jr., Edelman, Marc, & Kay, Cristóbal (2008). Transnational agrarian
movements confronting globalization. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brem-Wilson, Josh (2015). Towards food sovereignty: Interrogating peasant voice in the
United Nations Committee on World Food Security. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(1),
73–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.968143.
Brem-Wilson, Josh (2016). La Vía Campesina and the UN Committee on World Food
Security: Affected publics and institutional dynamics in the nascent transnational
public sphere. Review of International Studies, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0260210516000309 January.
CFS. (2009). Reform of the Committee on World Food Security: Final version. Rome: FAO.
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs0910/ReformDoc/CFS_2009_2_
Rev_2_E_K7197.pdf.
CFS. (2010). International food security and nutrition civil society mechanism for relations with
CFS. Rome http://www.csm4cfs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Proposal-for-an-
international-civil-society-mechanism.pdf.
Claeys, Priscilla, & Duncan, Jessica (2018a). Do we need to categorize it? Reflections on
constituencies and quotas as tools for negotiating difference in the global food so-
vereignty convergence space. Journal of Peasant Studies, 0(0), 1–22. https://doi.org/
10.1080/03066150.2018.1512489 Taylor & Francis.
Claeys, Priscilla, & Duncan, Jessica (2018b). Evaluation of the civil society mechanism
(CSM) for relations with the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS): Full report.
Rome http://www.csm4cfs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CSM-Evaluation-
Report-2018-ilovepdf-compressed.pdf.
CSM. n.d. Guidelines for facilitating common policy positions and messages through the
civil society mechanism. (Rome).
CSM. (2017). Annual report 2016-2017. Rome http://www.csm4cfs.org/csm-annual-
report-20162017/.
CSM. (2018). CSM update November-December. Rome http://www.csm4cfs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/CSM-Update-Nov-Dec-2018-ilovepdf-compressed.pdf.
Cumbers, Andy, Paul, Routledge, & Nativel, Corinne (2008). The entangled geographies
of global justice networks. Progress in Human Geography, 32(2), 183–201. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0309132507084818.
Davis, Gerald, McAdam, Doug, Richard Scott, W., & Zald, Mayer N. (2005). Social
movements and organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Duncan, Jessica (2015). Global food security governance: Civil society engagement in the
reformed Committee on World Food Security. London: Routledge.
Duncan, Jessica, & Barling, David (2012). Renewal through participation in global food
security governance: Implementing the international food security and nutrition civil
society mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security. International Journal of
Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19, 143–161.
Duncan, Jessica, & Claeys, Priscilla (2018). Politicizing food security governance through
participation: Opportunities and opposition. Food Security, 10(6), 1411–1424.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-018-0852-x.
Edelman, Marc, & Borras, Saturnino M., Jr. (2016). Political dynamics of transnational
agrarian movements. Rugby and Halifax. Practical Action Publishing and Fernwood.
Gaarde, Ingeborg (2017). Peasants negotiating a global policy space: La Vía Campesina in the
Committee on World Food Security. Oxon: Routledge.
Gioia, Paula. n.d.Coming out: gender diversity in the food system. Right to Food Watch.
Heidelberg. https://www.righttofoodandnutrition.org/watch.
Gitlin, Todd (1995). The twilight of common dreams: Why America is wracked by culture
wars. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Graeber, David (2002). The new anarchists. New Left Review, 13, 61–73. https://
newleftreview.org/II/13/david-graeber-the-new-anarchists.
Gutmann, Amy (2003). Identity in democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harvey, David (1996). Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell.
Juris, Jeffrey Scott (2004). Digital age activism: Anti-corporate globalization and the cultural
politics of transnational networking. Berkley: University of California.
Keane, John (2003). Global civil society? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
http://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2009/SOC777/Keane_GCS.pdf.
Kriesi, Hanspeter (1996). The organizational structure of new social movements in a
political context. In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, & Mayer N. Zald (Eds.).
Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing struc-
tures, and cultural framingsNew York: Cambridge University Press 152–84.
Meyer, David S., & Tarrow, Sidney (1998). A movement society: Contentious politics for a
new century. In David S. Meyer, & Sidney Tarrow (Eds.). The social movement society:
Contentious politics for a new century (pp. 1–28). Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.
Mills, Elyse N. (2018). Implicating ‘fisheries justice’ movements in food and climate politics.
Third World Quarterly1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1416288
January.
Nora, McKeon (2014). Food security governance: Empowering communities, regulating cor-
porations. Oxon: Routledge.
Nora, McKeon (2017). Are equity and sustainability a likely outcome when foxes and
chickens share the same coop? Critiquing the concept of multistakeholder governance
of food security. Globalizations, 14(3), https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.
1286168 Taylor & Francis: 379–98.
Piven, Frances Fox., & Cloward, Richard (1978). Poor people's movements: Why they suc-
ceed, how they fail. New York: Vintage.
Routledge, Paul (2009). Transnational resistance: Global justice networks and spaces of
convergence. Geography Compass, 3(5), 1881–1901. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
8198.2009.00261.x.
Routledge, Paul (2017). Space invaders: Radical geographies of protest. London: Pluto Press.
Routledge, Paul, & Cumbers, Andy (2009). Global justice networks: Geographies of trans-
national solidarity. Machester: Manchester University Press.
Sklair, Leslie (1995). Social movements and global capitalism. Sociology, 29(3), 495–512.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038595029003007.
Staggenborg, Suzanne (2013). Institutionalization of social movements. The wiley-black-
well encyclopedia of social and political movementsOxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing
Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm113.
Tarrow, Sidney (1998). Power in movement (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Taylor, Verta, & Whittier, Nancy (1999). Collective identity in social movement com-
munities. In Jo Freeman, & Victoria Johnson (Eds.). Waves of protest (pp. 104–129).
New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, Whitlinger, Claire, & Lim, Alwyn (2012). “International human rights
law and social movements: States' resistance and civil society's insistence. Annual
Review of Law and Social Science, 8(1), 367–396. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
lawsocsci-102811-173849.
Weldon (2012). When protest makes policy. How social movements represent disadvantaged
groups. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Weldon, S., & Laurel (2006). “Women's movements, identity politics, and policy impacts:
A study of policies on violence against women in the 50 United States. Political
Research Quarterly, 59(1), 111–122. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900110.
Zald, Mayer N., & McCarthy, John D. (1987). Social movements in an organizational society:
Collected essays. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
P. Claeys and J. Duncan Political Geography 75 (2019) 102045
13
